A characterization of inefficiency in stochastic overlapping generations economies by Bloise, Gaetano & Calciano, Filippo Luca
2007/93 
 
 
■ 
 
 
A characterization of inefficiency in stochastic 
overlapping generations economies 
 
 
Gaetano Bloise and Filippo L. Calciano 
 
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER   
2007/93 
 
A characterization of inefficiency in stochastic  
overlapping generations economies 
 
Gaetano BLOISE 1 and Filippo L. CALCIANO2  
 
December 2007 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we provide a characterization of interim inefficiency in stochastic economies of 
overlapping generations under possibly sequentially incomplete markets. With respect to the 
established body of results in the literature, we remove the hypothesis of two-period horizons, 
by considering longer, though uniformly bounded, horizons for generations. The 
characterization exploits a suitably Modified Cass Criterion, grounded on the long-run 
behavior of compounded safe interest rates and independent of the length of horizons of 
generations. Thus, the hypothesis of two-period horizons is purely heuristic in establishing a 
criterion for inefficiency. In addition, for sequentially incomplete markets, we adopt a suitable 
notion of unambiguous inefficiency, separating the inefficient intertemporal allocation of 
resources from incomplete risk-sharing. Unambiguous inefficiency reduces to inefficiency 
when markets are sequentially complete. 
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1. Introduction
It is well established that competitive equilibrium might not achieve an opti-
mal allocation of resources in economies of overlapping generations (Samuelson
[19]). This inefficiency might occur even though competitive markets operate per-
fectly, as in the Arrow-Debreu abstraction. It is commonly understood as a lack
of transversality condition, caused by the fact that generations act over short hori-
zons compared with the infinite horizon of the economy, so that benefits from trade
remain unexploited at infinitum. In order for this sort of market failure to jus-
tify active policy intervention (as social security), a suitable empirical criterion is
needed for identifying unoptimality in the intertemporal allocation of resources, a
criterion possibly grounded only on aggregate economic magnitudes. Does the mere
observation of competitive prices fully reveal inefficiency?
This issue is of long tradition in general equilibrium. Intuitively, inefficiency re-
quires that real interest rate (net of growth) be sufficiently negative in the long-run,
an admittedly vague and unprecise statement when interest rate fluctuates. Inspired
by the original studies of Cass [10] and Benveniste [6, 7] on capital theory, Balasko
and Shell [3] and Okuno and Zilcha [18] initially proposed a precise necessary and
sufficient Cass Criterion for inefficiency: the infinite sum of the reciprocals of (the
norm of) present value prices of commodities over periods of trade converges. Their
work was extended by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [15] to growing economies;
by Aiyagari and Peled [1] (and, more recently, by Barbie and Kaul [5]) to recursive
equilibria of economies with uncertainty; by Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [12] to
economies with uncertainty; by Burke [9] and Molina-Abraldes and Pintos-Clape´s
[17] to economies with heterogeneous horizons for generations without uncertainty.
Apart from these latter contributions, all of them adopt the simplifying hypoth-
esis of two-period horizons for generations. In addition, with the only exception
of Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [12] in part of their analysis, all of them assume
sequentially complete markets. Optimality under sequentially incomplete markets
was also studied by Chattopadhyay [11] and Henriksen and Spear [16].
In this note, we propose an extension of the analysis under uncertainty. In
particular, differently from (most of) the literature, we allow for arbitrarily long,
though uniformly bounded, horizons for generations and for possibly sequentially
incomplete markets. Though these two extensions could be treated be means of a
unified approach, it is worth separating the former from the latter, both for a more
transparent presentation and because the former might be of interest independently
of the latter. We first consider the case of sequentially complete markets.
For economies with two-period horizons for generations, Chattopadhyay and
Gottardi [12] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for inefficiency, consisting
in a sort of Weighted Cass Criterion: along any path, the weighted infinite sum of
the reciprocals of prices converges. In addition, for recursive equilibria, elaborating
on the criterion of Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [12], a recent work by Barbie and
Kaul [5] presents an alternative characterization of inefficiency by means of a sort
of First Order Condition, requiring the existence of bounded transfers whose value,
in every state of nature, is less than their expected value in the following period.
In stochastic economies with two-period horizons for generations, when equi-
librium allocation is inefficient, without loss of generality, a welfare improvement
obtains by transferring resources from young individuals to old individuals. In
economies with longer horizons for generations, instead, a welfare improvement
might require a larger class of transfers. Thus, the extension to longer horizons of
the characterization in the literature is not straightforward.
In order to carry out our extension and to provide a simpler Cass Criterion,
we slightly modify the notion of inefficiency. An allocation is robustly inefficient
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if a welfare improvement exists even though a constant, however small, share of
transferred resources is to be destroyed. This stronger notion of inefficiency permits
to avoid the common assumption of a lower bound on the curvature of indifference
curves, which is ecumenically adopted in the literature (for instance, Chattopadhyay
and Gottardi [12, Definition 4]). In addition, it allows for more direct and straight
arguments in the proofs. An interesting interpretation of robust inefficiency is
that an hypothetical planner might achieve a welfare improvement even holding
an unprecise knowledge of the (bounded) curvatures of indifference curves, that is,
independently of (bounded) second order effects.
We show that, under acceptably restrictive assumptions, inefficiency of compet-
itive equilibrium is equivalent to a suitably Modified Cass Criterion. The specific
nature of welfare improving transfers is irrelevant, as only their long-run proper-
ties matter. More precisely, inefficiency is equivalent to the existence of bounded
positive hypothetical transfers of commodities, {et}, satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0,
ρEtpt+1et+1 ≥ ptet,
where {pt} is the process of Arrow-Debreu prices, or contingent claim prices. These
transfers are hypothetical as they need not coincide with those producing the welfare
improvement, which might be largely more dispersed. Importantly, inefficiency can
be equivalently characterized by means of the positive linear operator defined by
T (e)t =
1
pt
Etpt+1et+1.
It exactly corresponds to the existence of a real eigenvalue, of such a linear operator,
larger than the unity, with associated bounded eigenvector. This is reminiscence of
the Dominant Root Characterization (Aiyagari and Peled [1]) for stochastic recur-
sive equilibria (Perron-Frobenius Theorem). Hence, our characterization is tight,
as it exploits the same criterion for possibly non-recursive equilibria.
Beyond generality, our Modified Cass Criterion bears two major advantages on
the established criteria in the literature. First, on a theoretical ground, it is inde-
pendent of the length of horizons of generations, thus showing that the hypothesis
of two-period horizons is purely heuristic in identifying a criterion for inefficiency.
Second, for practical purposes, comparing with the Weighted Cass Criterion, our
Modified Cass Criterion appears of more direct application in empirical work, both
because of its simpler formulation and because it allows for exploiting time series
of prices of any time frequency (see lemmas 6 and 9 in appendix B).
The characterization is further extended to sequentially incomplete markets.
When markets are incomplete, any equilibrium allocation is typically inefficient,
as the lack of financial instruments inhibits complete insurance. Thus, a prelimi-
nary issue consists in establishing what sort, or which part, of inefficiency is to be
revealed by observable asset prices, through a (Modified) Cass Criterion. The issue
of separating different forms of inefficiency is conceptually deep and, perhaps, any
of such separations is disputable and artificial, as those proposed by Chattopahyay
and Gottardi [12] and Chattopadhyay [11]. We adopt a notion of unambiguous inef-
ficiency, corresponding to the occurrence of a welfare improvement for all subjective
evaluations of risk by individuals that are consistent with observable asset prices.
Taking into account the multiplicity of implicit Arrow-Debreu prices, an identical
Modified Cass Criterion characterizes inefficiency under sequentially complete and
sequentially incomplete asset markets. More precisely, unambiguous inefficiency is
equivalent to the existence of bounded positive hypothetical transfers of commodi-
ties, {et}, satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0,
ρEtpt+1et+1 ≥ ptet,
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at every process of implicit Arrow-Debreu prices, {pt}, consistent with the absence
of arbitrage opportunities. Clearly, when markets are sequentially complete, such a
process is uniquely determinate, up to one innocuous degree of multiplicity, so that
the Modified Cass Criterion reduces to that previously established under sequen-
tially complete markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the hypotheses
on the economy. In section 3, we provide the characterization under sequentially
complete markets. In section 4, we extend the analysis to sequentially incomplete
markets. Finally, appendix A presents a digression on budget constraints under
sequentially incomplete markets, whereas appendix B collects all proofs.
2. Fundamentals
2.1. Time and uncertainty. Time and uncertainty are represented by an event-
tree S, a countably infinite set, endowed with ordering . For a date-event σ in S,
t (σ) in T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t, . . .} denotes its date and
σ+ = {τ ∈ S (σ) : t (τ) = t (σ) + 1}
is the non-empty finite set of all immediate direct successors, where
S (σ) = {τ ∈ S : τ  σ} .
The initial date-event is φ in S, with t (φ) = 0, that is, σ  φ for every σ in S. This
construction is canonical (Debreu [14, Chapter 7]).
2.2. Vector space notation and terminology. As far as notation and terminol-
ogy for vector spaces are concerned, we shall basically follow Aliprantis and Border
[2, Chapters 5-8]. Consider the vector space of all real maps on S, RS , endowed
with the canonical (product) ordering. An element v of RS is positive (respectively,
strictly positive) if vσ ≥ 0 for every σ in S (respectively, vσ > 0 for every σ in S).
In addition, if an element v of RS is non-null and positive, we shall write v > 0.
For an element v of RS , v+ in RS and v− in RS are, respectively, its positive part
and its negative part, so that v = v+−v− in RS and |v| = v++v− in RS . Also, for
an arbitrary collection
{
vj
}
j∈J of elements of R
S , its supremum and its infimum
in RS , if they exist, are denoted, respectively, by∨
j∈J
vj and
∧
j∈J
vj .
To simplify presentation, we shall adopt some notational conventions. First, for
an element v = (vσ)σ∈S of RS , for every σ in S, vσ is regarded itself as an element of
RS , so that v =
∑
σ∈S vσ. Second, C is the (Riesz) vector subspace of RS consisting
of all real maps on S vanishing at all but finitely many σ in S. Third, L is the
(Riesz) vector subspace of RS consisting of all bounded real maps on S. Finally, the
positive cone of any (Riesz) vector subspace F of RS is {v ∈ F : v ≥ 0}.
2.3. Commodity space. The commodity space, L, is the vector space of all
bounded real maps on S. Thus, a single physical commodity is traded and consumed
at every date-event σ in S. The element u of L denotes the unitary endowment of
commodities, that is, a unit of L. The supremum norm on L is given by
‖v‖ = inf {λ > 0 : |v| ≤ λu} .
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2.4. Overlapping generations. The (countably infinite) set of individuals is G.
Such individuals are distributed across generations, each consisting of a single in-
dividual, whose economic activity extends over (n+ 1) (consecutive) periods, with
n in N. In particular, every individual i in G is active over a finite subset Si of S.
In addition, for every date event σ in S, (a) there exists a single individual i (σ) in
G initiating her economic activity, that is, with
Si(σ) = {τ ∈ S (σ) : t (τ) ≤ t (σ) + n} ;
(b) there exist exactly (n+ 1) individuals that are active, that is, for every σ in
S, the cardinality of {i ∈ G : σ ∈ Si} is (n+ 1). Notice that the map i : S →
G associates a new individual to every date-event. In addition, a finite set of
individuals is inherited from the unrepresented past at the initial date-event.
2.5. Preferences. The consumption space of individual i in G is Xi, the positive
cone of Li, the set of real maps on S vanishing on (S/Si), regarded as a (Riesz)
vector subspace of L. Preferences i on Xi of individual i in G are continuous,
(strictly) monotone and (weakly) convex.
2.6. Allocations. The space of allocations is
X =
{
x ∈
∏
i∈G
Xi :
∑
i∈G
xi ∈ L
}
.
So, an allocation x in X involves an aggregate endowment,∑
i∈G
xi =
(∑
i∈G
xiσ
)
σ∈S
,
that is bounded, that is,
∑
i∈G x
i ≤ λu for some λ > 0. An allocation x in X is
interior if there exists λ > 0 such that, for every individual i in G, xi ≥ λui, where
ui is the unit vector in Li. Finally, allocation z in X Pareto dominates (respectively,
strictly Pareto dominates) allocation x in X if, for every individual i in G, zi i xi
and, for some (respectively, for every) individual i in G, zi i xi.
2.7. Prices. Under sequentially complete markets, commodities have well-defined
Arrow-Debreu prices, or contingent claim prices. A price p is an element of
P =
{
p ∈ RS : pσ > 0 for every σ ∈ S
}
,
the space of all strictly positive maps on S. A price p in P defines a positive linear
functional on C, the vector subspace of L consisting of all real maps on S vanishing
at all but finitely many σ in S, where, for an element v of C, the duality is given
by
p · v =
∑
σ∈S
pσvσ.
Thus, as a matter of mere fact, it defines a positive linear functional on the com-
modity space Li of every individual i in G, though it might not be a well-defined
linear functional on the aggregate commodity space L.
2.8. Price support. Competitive equilibrium is simply represented in terms of
supporting prices. An allocation x in X is supported by a price p in P if, for every
individual i in G,
zi i xi implies p · (zi − xi) > 0.
Notice that, under the maintained assumptions on preferences, price support yields,
for every individual i in G,
zi i xi implies p · (zi − xi) ≥ 0.
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The property of price support, which captures optimality of individual consumption
plans, is strengthened in part of the analysis.
Smooth support. An allocation x in X, with supporting price p in P , is smoothly
supported by price p in P if, for every 1 > ρ > 0, there exists λ > 0 such that, for
every individual i in G, provided that ∥∥zi − xi∥∥ ≤ λ,
ρp · (zi − xi)+ ≥ p · (zi − xi)− implies zi i xi.
Thus, smooth support requires that, locally, whenever the ρ-discounted value of
positive net trades exceeds the value of negative net trades, a consumption plan
be weakly welfare improving for an individual. Geometrically, this implies that the
(translated) convex cone{
zi ∈ Xi : ρp · (zi − xi)+ ≥ p · (zi − xi)−}
is locally contained in the weakly preferred set
{
zi ∈ Xi : zi i xi}. This notion,
which is weaker than the common assumption of an upper bound on the curvature
of indifference curves (see, for instance, Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [12, Defini-
tion 5]), was introduced, and discussed, in Bloise [8]. Smooth support basically
prevents an arbitrarily small degree of substitutability among commodities. It is
an acceptably restrictive hypothesis.
2.9. Robust inefficiency. An allocation x inX is robustly inefficient if it is Pareto
dominated by an alternative allocation z in X satisfying, for some 1 >  > 0,∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)+ ≤ (1− )∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)− .
Thus, at a robustly inefficient allocation, a welfare improvement obtains by a modi-
fication of consumption plans notwithstanding the destruction of a positive fraction
of transferred resources. This definition is meant to capture the occurrence of robust
Pareto improvements.
3. Characterization
We here provide an equivalent characterization of robust inefficiency in terms of
supporting prices. In particular, we show that prices reveal inefficiency indepen-
dently of the length of horizons of generations. Our argument is developed in two
separate parts. First, we reduce the economy to a fictitious economy with genera-
tions operating over two-period horizons, as originally proposed by Balasko, Cass
and Shell [4], so obtaining restrictions on supporting prices. Second, we retrace
these constraints on prices to the original economy. For the second part of the
argument, we need an additional restriction at equilibrium on the volatility of safe
interest rates.
Non-vanishing (gross) interest rates. A price p in P satisfies the hypothesis
of non-vanishing (gross) interest rates if there exists 1 > η > 0 such that, for every
σ in S,
pσ ≥ η
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ .
So, under the domain of this hypothesis, (gross) safe interest rates are uniformly
bounded from below across periods of trade. Observe that uniformly positive (gross)
interest rates imply that, for any m in T , at every σ in S,
(†) pσ ≥
(
1
m+ 1
)
ηm
∑
τ∈S(σ)t(σ)+m
pτ ,
5
where, for a subset F of S, F t = {σ ∈ F : t (σ) ≤ t} for every t in T . This straightly
follows from solving forward the inequality and adding up terms.
In order to proceed with the characterization, we introduce some additional
pieces of notation and preliminarily establish the equivalence among some restric-
tions concerning the long-run behavior of prices. First of all, given a price p in P ,
we define a linear operator Tp : L→ RS by setting, for every σ in S,
Tp (e)σ =
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ .
This operator is positive and, under the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross) interest
rates, maps L into itself, as, for every σ in S,
(‡) |Tp (e)σ| ≤
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ |eτ | ≤ ‖e‖ 1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ ≤ 1
η
‖e‖ .
Second, for a comparison with the literature, we use the notion of weight function,
initially introduced in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [12]. An element λ of L is a
super-martingale if, for every σ in S,∑
τ∈σ+
λτ ≥ λσ.
The set of such super-martingales is denoted by Λ.
Modified Cass Criterion. Given a price p in P , the Modified Cass Criterion is
given by one of the following equivalent conditions.
(foc) There exists e > 0 in L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ≥ pσeσ.
(plo) There exists e > 0 in L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0,
ρTp (e) ≥ e.
Proposition 1 (Equivalent criteria). Under the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross)
interest rates, given a price p in P , the following conditions are equivalent to the
Modified Cass Criterion.
(wcc) There exists λ > 0 in Λ satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
pσ ≥
(
1
ρ
)t(σ)
λσ.
(drc) The linear operator Tp : L → L admits a real eigenvalue greater than the
unity.
Remark 1 (Spectral radius). The spectral radius of a positive linear operator T
from L into itself is defined as
r (T ) = lim
n∈N
‖Tn‖ 1n = inf
n∈N
‖Tn‖ 1n .
As L is a Banach lattice and T is a positive linear operator, it is well-known that
r (T ) belongs to the spectrum σ (T ), where
σ (T ) = {λ ∈ C : λI − T is not invertible} .
This means that condition (drc) is satisfied only if the spectral radius is greater
than the unity, r (T ) > 1.
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Remark 2 (Comparison with the literature). Notice that condition (wcc) implies
that there exists a super-martingale λ > 0 in Λ such that, for every path {σt}t∈T
of S, ∑
t∈T
λσt
pσt
≤ 1,
where a path {σt}t∈T of S is an element of ST such that, for every t in T , σt+1
belongs to σt+. This is the necessary and sufficient Weighted Cass Criterion estab-
lished in the literature (Gottardi and Chattopadhyay [12]). In addition, condition
(foc) is similar to the First Order Condition Criterion presented by Barbie and
Kaul [5] for recursive equilibria and condition (drc) is basically the Dominant Root
Characterization in Aiyagari and Peled [1] (see also Chattopadhyay and Gottardi
[12]) for stationary equilibria.
Remark 3 (Independence of the length of horizons). Notice that the Modified
Cass Criterion is independent of the length of horizons of generations. Thus, the
characterization below implies that longer horizons do not affect the criterion for in-
efficiency obtained under the simplifying assumption of two-period horizons, unless
safe (gross) interest rates vanish along some branches of the event-tree.
The characterization exploits the Modified Cass Criterion. This basically re-
quires that, in every period of trade, the (present) value of a positive transfer be
below a constant share of the (present) value of the positive transfers in the follow-
ing period. For two-period horizons, such quantities coincide with physical transfers
of resources from young to old individuals. For longer horizons, a welfare improve-
ment might obtain through a more sophisticated structure of physical transfers,
which nevertheless correspond to values in any given horizon of constant length
(n) falling below a constant share of values in the following horizons of constant
length (n). When safe (gross) interest rates are non-vanishing, such values can be
transformed into physical quantities in the original economy.
For two-period horizons, the argument for necessity is extremely straight. Indeed,
assuming robust inefficiency, at every date-event σ in S, let the transfer correspond
to the negative net trade of the young individual, that is,
eσ =
(
zi(σ) − xi(σ)
)−
σ
.
As the feasible welfare improvement is to be initiated at some date-event, e is a
non-null positive element of L. In addition, at every date-event σ in S, by feasibility,
xi(σ) − eσ + ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
eτ ≥ zi(σ),
as the consumption of the individual, who is young at that date-event, in the second
period of activity cannot exceed a given share, ρ, of the negative net trades of young
individuals at the following date-events. It is for the existence of such a given share
that robust inefficiency plays its major role in the argument. Thus, at every date-
event σ in S, price support yields
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ≥ pσeσ,
which is the Modified Cass Criterion. The extension of this simple argument to
longer horizons requires a transformation of values into quantities. This transfor-
mation can be carried out exploiting the uniform positivity of (gross) interest rates,
for, otherwise, it would yield unbounded physical quantities.
The argument for sufficiency, under smooth support, is even more elementary
and, in addition, is independent of the length of horizons. Indeed, an alternative
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allocation is constructed by means of feasible transfers fulfilling, at every date-event
σ in S,
zi(σ) = xi(σ) − eσ +
∑
τ∈σ+
eτ .
By the Modified Cass Criterion, at every date-event σ in S,
ρp ·
(
zi(σ) − xi(σ)
)+
≥ p ·
(
zi(σ) − xi(σ)
)−
,
so that smooth support yields a welfare improvement.
Proposition 2 (Characterization). Under the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross)
interest rates, an interior allocation x in X, with smoothly supporting price p in P ,
is robustly inefficient if and only if the Modified Cass Criterion is satisfied.
Remark 4 (Extensions). The hypotheses of a single commodity per period and a
single individual per generation are not really used, so that they could be possibly re-
moved. In addition, as in Molina-Abraldes and Pintos-Clape´s [17], the equal length
of horizons of generations is not at all exploited, apart from its role in simplifying
notation. It would suffice to postulate the existence of an upper bound.
4. Sequentially Incomplete Markets
4.1. Conceptual separation. We have provided a characterization of inefficiency
under the hypothesis of sequentially complete markets. When markets are sequen-
tially incomplete, two independent sources of inefficiency emerge: on the one side,
the overlapping generations structure might cause a lack of transversality at infini-
tum; on the other side, the absence of financial instruments might inhibit complete
insurance. The former cause of inefficiency pertains to the mere intertemporal al-
location of resources, independently of risk. The latter cause of inefficiency regards
the distribution of risk among individuals and it is not peculiar to overlapping
generations economies, as it is exhibited by finite-horizon economies as well under
incomplete financial markets. Can these two distinct phenomena be separated in
principle?
Under incomplete markets, at equilibrium, individuals might have different sub-
jective evaluations of risk, or subjective prices for risk. This disparity in evaluations
allows an hypothetical planner to generate a welfare improvement, by redistributing
from individuals with low evaluation to individuals with high evaluation. Such a
sort of welfare improving reallocations necessarily requires the knowledge of sub-
jective prices for risk of individuals. Undisputably, the observation of asset prices
alone does not fully reveal subjective prices for risk under sequentially incomplete
markets.
A failure of efficiency in the intertemporal allocation of resources, instead, might
be revealed by asset prices alone. That is, an hypothetical planner might be able
to Pareto improve independently of subjective prices for risk by individuals or,
equivalently, for all subjective prices for risk that are consistent with the absence of
arbitrage opportunities at observable asset prices. This sort of welfare improvement,
ignoring unexploited insurance opportunities, cannot occur over finite horizons.
Thus, in a sense, it captures a lack of transversality at infinitum.
Moving from the above considerations, we here propose a notion of unambiguous
inefficiency, consisting in the occurrence of a welfare improvement for all subjective
evaluations of risk. Asset prices fully reveal unambiguous inefficiency by means of
a sort of Modified Cass Criterion. Importantly, this criterion corresponds to that
for sequentially complete markets, evaluated at all implicit Arrow-Debreu prices,
consistent with the absence of arbitrage opportunities. Thus, the same criterion
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reveals (unambiguous) inefficiency under sequentially complete and sequentially
incomplete markets.
4.2. Comparison with the literature. In the literature, apart from Gottardi
and Chattopadhyay [12] and Chattopadhyay [11], to the best of our knowledge,
there are no other contributions proposing a separation of inefficiency in the in-
tertemporal allocation of resources from inefficiency in the allocation of risk for
stochastic economies of overlapping generations. We briefly discuss the approaches
presented in these mentioned essays. A comparison with Henriksen and Spear [16],
which instead avoids any issue of separation, is presented in remark 6.
For two-period horizons, Chattopadyhay and Gottardi [12] adopt a notion of ex
post efficiency, corresponding to an evaluation of welfare of individuals conditional
on the realization of uncertainty in the second period of their lives. Such a criterion
requires separability in preferences (see their assumption 2 and their definition 6)
and the existence of only a single safe asset at every date-event (see their definition
7). In addition, whereas our criterion for incomplete markets coincides with the
established criterion for complete markets, their criterion is stronger when applied
to complete markets (see their remark 5), as stronger is ex post inefficiency with
respect to canonical inefficiency. Finally, their formulation of the necessary and
sufficient criterion for ex post inefficiency exploits the observation of subjective
prices of individuals, that is, the criterion is expressed in terms of weighted sum of
reciprocals of subjective prices of some individuals.
For two-period horizons, Chattopadhyay [11] proposes a notion of constrained in-
efficiency, corresponding to a welfare improving modification of consumption plans
by means of a feasible redistribution of the holdings of assets in positive net supply,
along with direct transfers only in the first period of activity of individuals. This
construction requires to take as given asset prices in order to determine the deliv-
eries of long-term assets and, hence, the space of allowed redistributions. A major
difference with our formulation is that inefficiency depends on the particular set of
traded infinite-maturity assets. To understand this, consider a simple stationary
economy under uncertainty, with sequentially complete markets, and suppose that,
at a fully stationary equilibrium, the safe interest rate is negative. This allocation
is necessarily constrained efficient according to Chattopadhyay’s [11] notion, be-
cause of the absence of assets in positive net supply. However, it is unambiguously
inefficient in our formulation.
4.3. Price support. To the only purpose of simplifying presentation, we assume
the existence of a single one-period riskless asset that is traded at every date-event.
That is, at every date-event, one unit of such an asset delivers one unit of the
single commodity at every immediately succeeding date-event. An asset price is q
in Q =
{
q ∈ RS : qσ > 0 for every σ ∈ S
}
. The absence of arbitrage opportunities
implies the existence of state prices, or contingent claim prices, that is, a set of
implicit Arrow-Debreu prices,
P (q) =
p ∈ P : pσqσ = ∑
τ∈σ+
pτ for every σ ∈ S
 .
Clearly, P (q) is a non-empty convex (open) cone. More general asset structures
might be straightly encompassed in our analysis, as, in the proofs, arguments are
presented in greater generality. The hypothesis of sequentially complete asset mar-
kets, in the general case, obtains when P (q) is, up to a normalization, a singleton.
As for sequentially complete markets, competitive equilibrium is represented only
in terms supporting prices. An allocation x in X is supported by an asset price q
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in Q if, for every individual i in G,
zi i xi implies
∨
p∈P (q)
p · (zi − xi) > 0.
This is a condition for optimality of consumption plans subject to budget con-
straints, under sequentially incomplete markets. We take it as a primitive notion,
though a clarifying digression on the dual representation of sequential budget con-
strains is presented in appendix A.
Remark 5 (Subjective prices). An interior allocation x in X is supported by an
asset price q in Q if and only if, for every individual i in G, there exists pi in P (q)
satisfying
zi i xi implies pi · (zi − xi) > 0.
Smooth support. An allocation x in X, with supporting asset price q in Q, is
smoothly supported by asset price q in Q if, for every 1 > ρ > 0, there exists λ > 0
satisfying, for every individual i in G, provided that ∥∥zi − xi∥∥ ≤ λ,
ρp · (zi − xi)+ ≥ p · (zi − xi)− , for every p ∈ P (q) , implies zi i xi.
This notion of smooth support is no more restrictive than the corresponding
hypothesis for sequentially complete markets, as, for every individual i in G, there
exists a subjective price pi in P (q).
4.4. Unambiguous inefficiency. We now introduce the notion of unambiguous
inefficiency, with a digression on its economic content and implications. An alloca-
tion x in X, with supporting asset price q in Q, is robustly unambiguously inefficient
if it is Pareto dominated by an allocation z in X satisfying, for some 1 >  > 0,∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)+ ≤ (1− )∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)−
and, for every individual i in G,
(§)
∧
p∈P (q)
p · (zi − xi) ≥ 0.
Notice that, provided that preferences are locally non-satiated, robust unambiguous
inefficiency coincides with robust inefficiency under sequentially complete markets,
as the condition (§) for an unambiguous welfare improvement becomes redundant
(i.e., it becomes a consequence of price support).
The unambiguous feature of inefficiency, being the major contribution of our
analysis, requires adequate justification. In order to understand the implications of
restriction (§), consider a feasible redistribution z in X for which it fails. Thus, for
some individual i in G, there exists p∗ in P (q) satisfying
p∗ · (zi − xi) < 0.
Such a redistribution might be welfare improving only if p∗ in P (q) is not a subjec-
tive price for individual i in G. Consequently, the notion of unambiguous inefficiency
rules out such situations, which are ambiguous in the sense that to ascertain welfare
improvement requires a precise knowledge of unobservable subjective prices.
On a purely analytical ground, unambiguous inefficiency might be interpreted as
an artificial concept that precisely identifies a particular class of welfare improving
redistributions whose occurrence is fully revealed by the observation of equilibrium
asset prices alone. Some other sources of inefficiency remain, but their exact iden-
tification requires more information than the mere observation of asset prices.
Alternatively, we might propose a positive interpretation of unambiguous ineffi-
ciency in terms of instruments available to an hypothetical planner. Indeed, robust
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unambiguous inefficiency might be interpreted as a situation in which, under the
validity of the hypothesis of smooth support, an hypothetical planner might Pareto
improve upon the initial allocation by simply exploiting the information on prefer-
ences that are revealed by asset prices. In other terms, a feasible welfare improving
reallocation is consistent with all arbitrary specifications of preferences, consistent
with optimality of consumption plans, given asset prices, that fulfill smooth sup-
port. More precisely, robust unambiguous inefficiency corresponds to the existence
of a feasible redistribution guaranteeing, for every individual, that, evaluated at all
possible consistent state prices, a constant share of the value of positive net trade
be above the value of negative net trade.
Lemma 1 (Unambiguous inefficiency). An allocation x in X, with smoothly sup-
porting asset price q in Q, is robustly unambiguously inefficient if and only if there
exists an allocation z in X (not coinciding with x in X) satisfying∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)+ ≤∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)−
and, for some 1 > ρ > 0, for every individual i in G,
ρp · (zi − xi)+ ≥ p · (zi − xi)− , for every p ∈ P (q) ,
which obviously implies ∧
p∈P (q)
p · (zi − xi) ≥ 0.
Unambiguous inefficiency does not occur over a finite horizon, notwithstanding
missing financial markets. So, in this sense, this notion captures a robust failure
of efficiency at equilibrium that is not caused by an unoptimal allocation of risk
across individuals.
Lemma 2 (Long-run nature of unambiguous inefficiency). If an allocation x in X,
with supporting asset price q in Q, is Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation
z in X satisfying ∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)+ ≤∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)−
and, for every individual i in G,∧
p∈P (q)
p · (zi − xi) ≥ 0,
then G∗ = {i ∈ G : ∣∣zi − xi∣∣ > 0} is a countably infinite set.
Unambiguous inefficiency requires an infinite value of the aggregate endowment
for all consistent evaluations of risk. This is of relevance for economies in which
productive assets are traded in the asset market.
Lemma 3 (Summable state prices). An allocation x in X, with supporting asset
price q in Q, is robustly unambiguously inefficient only if∧
p∈P (q)
p ·
∑
i∈G
xi is infinite.
Remark 6 (Productive asset). The result of lemma 3 shows that, whenever a suf-
ficiently productive infinite-maturity asset is traded in the asset market, competitive
equilibrium is not robustly unambiguously inefficient. Similarly, in a straightforward
extension of Chattopadhyay and Gottardi’s [12] analysis, an equilibrium allocation is
ex post efficient in the presence of a sufficiently productive infinite-maturity asset.
This, in particular, implies that all equilibrium allocations, that are considered by
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Henriksen and Spear [16], are not robustly unambiguously inefficient, as a produc-
tive asset yields a non-negligible share of the aggregate endowment. Nevertheless, as
Henriksen and Spear’s [16] analysis shows, by a mere reallocation of risk, a substan-
tial welfare improvement might exist, even leading to the socially optimal stationary
allocation of full insurance.
4.5. Characterization. As for sequentially complete markets, in order to extend
the characterization to longer horizons, we impose an additional restriction about
non-vanishing (gross) interest rates at equilibrium.
Non-vanishing (gross) interest rates. An asset price q in Q satisfies the hy-
pothesis of non-vanishing interest rates if there exists 1 > η > 0 satisfying, for
every σ in S,
pσ ≥ η
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ , for every p ∈ P (q) .
Given an asset price q inQ, under the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross) interest
rates, the (non-linear) operator
∧
p∈P (q) Tp : L → RS is well-defined, where, for
every σ in S,  ∧
p∈P (q)
Tp (e)

σ
=
∧
p∈P (q)
Tp (e)σ .
This operator is positive and, as a matter of fact, it maps L into itself, as condition
(‡) establishes bounds that are independent of the particular price p in P (q).
Modified Cass Criterion. Given a asset price q in Q, the Modified Cass Criterion
is given by one of the following equivalent conditions.
(foc) There exists e > 0 in L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ≥ pσeσ, for every p ∈ P (q) .
(plo) There exists e > 0 in L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0,
ρ
∧
p∈P (q)
Tp (e) ≥ e.
The characterization exploits the Modified Cass Criterion. The argument for suf-
ficiency is a straightforward adaptation of that in the case of sequentially complete
markets. For two-period horizons, the argument for necessity requires a minimal
modification. In particular, exactly reproducing the construction for sequential
complete markets, price support simply implies
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ≥ pσeσ, for some p ∈ P (q) ,
which is insufficient to prove the claim. However, unambiguous inefficiency (restric-
tion (§)) yields
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ≥ pσeσ, for every p ∈ P (q) ,
which exactly corresponds to the Modified Cass Criterion. The extension of this
simple argument to longer horizons again requires a transformation of values into
quantities, which is not as straight as for sequentially complete markets.
Proposition 3 (Characterization). Under the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross)
interest rates, an interior allocation x in X, with smoothly supporting asset price q
in Q, is robustly unambiguously inefficient if and only if the Modified Cass Criterion
is satisfied.
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Remark 7 (Extensions). Though we have assumed the existence of a single risk-
less asset, our arguments can be straightly generalized to encompass alternative
structures of incomplete markets. Notice, however, that the hypothesis of non-
vanishing (gross) interest rates requires the availability, at every date-event, of some
financial instrument to transfer wealth at the following date-events.
5. Conclusion
We have provided a characterization of inefficiency in stochastic economies of
overlapping generations operating over long horizons, under both sequentially com-
plete and sequentially incomplete markets. The proposed Modified Cass Criterion
is simple and suitable for empirical work. It is basically a generalization of the
well-known Dominant Root Characterization for stationary equilibria.
The conceptual separation of long-run inefficiency from limited insurance, under
incomplete markets, might be of application also in other economies with incomplete
markets, or borrowing constraints, under the hypothesis of a finite set of patient
individuals. This might serve to assess benefits from active policy intervention even
though market imperfections cannot be removed.
As a final remark, we observe that the methodology might be appropriate for
providing an empirical (local) measure of inefficiency, along the lines of Debreu
[13], inversely proportional to the smallest coefficient, ρ, fulfilling the Modified
Cass Criterion.
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Appendix A. Incomplete markets and budget constraints
Given an asset price q in Q, a portfolio h in C, the vector space of all real maps
on S vanishing at all but finitely many σ in S, generates a revenue r (q, h) in C by
means of
rφ (q, h) = −qφhφ
and, for every σ in S,
(rτ (q, h))τ∈σ+ = (hσ − qτhτ )τ∈σ+ .
Notice that, given any h in C, for every p in P (q),
p · r (q, h) =
∑
σ∈S
−pσqσ + ∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
hσ = 0.
This makes sense as h belongs to C and, thus, the above sum involves only finitely
many non-null terms.
The sequential budget constraint of individual i in G, for an initial endowment
of commodities ei in Xi, is given by
Bi
(
q, ei
)
=
{
xi ∈ Xi : xi ≤ ei + r (q, h) for some h ∈ C} .
This budget set admits an equivalent characterization in terms of Arrow-Debreu
prices.
Lemma 4 (Dual representation of budget constrains). For every xi in Xi,
xi ∈ Bi (q, ei) if and only if ∨
p∈P (q)
p · (xi − ei) ≤ 0.
Proof of lemma 4. Necessity is trivial. For sufficiency, endow C with the inductive
limit topology (see Burbaki, Topological Vector Spaces), that is, the finest locally
convex topology on C such that the natural embedding of any finite dimensional
subspace K of C is continuous, where K is endowed with its unique Hausdorff
linear topology. Relevantly, a subset F of C is closed if and only if, for every
fnite dimensional subspace K of C, K ∩ F is closed in the unique Hausdorff linear
topology of K. The topological dual of C coincides with its algebraic dual, and can
be identifed with RS .
Assume that there exists xi in Xi such that∨
p∈P (q)
p · (xi − ei) ≤ 0 and xi 6∈ Bi (q, ei) .
This implies that the closed convex set K = r (q, C) − C+ in C does not contain(
xi − ei) in C. By the Strong Separating Hyperplane Theorem (see Corollary 5.59
in Aliprantis and Border [2]), there exists a non-null pi in RS such that, for every
(h, v) in C × C+,
pi · (xi − ei) > pi · r (q, h)− p · v.
By canonical arguments, this implies that pi > 0 in RS and that, for every h in C,
pi · r (q, h) =
∑
σ∈S
−piσqσ + ∑
τ∈σ+
piτ
hσ = 0,
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that is, for every σ in S,
piσqσ =
∑
τ∈σ+
piτ .
Therefore, pegging any p in P (q), for every  > 0, pi + p is an element of P (q).
For every  > 0, this yields
pi · (xi − ei)+ p · (xi − ei) ≤ (pi + p) · (xi − ei) ≤ 0,
a contradiction as pi · (xi − ei) > 0. 
Thus, optimality of consumption plan requires∨
p∈P (q)
p · (xi − ei) ≤ 0
and
zi i xi implies
∨
p∈P (q)
p · (zi − ei) > 0.
In turn, optimality implies price support, as, for every p in P (q),
p · (zi − ei) ≤ ∨
p∈P (q)
p · (zi − xi)+ ∨
p∈P (q)
p · (xi − ei) .
Lemma 5 (Subjective prices). For every xi in the interior of Xi,
zi i xi implies
∨
p∈P (q)
p · (zi − xi) > 0
if and only if, for some pi in P (q),
zi i xi implies pi · (zi − xi) > 0.
Proof of lemma 5. One implication is obvious. For the other implication, the (non-
empty) convex sets Zi =
{
zi ∈ Xi : zi i xi} and
Bi =
yi ∈ Xi : ∨
p∈P (q)
p · (yi − xi) ≤ 0

have an empty intersection. A canonical argument of separation yields pi > 0 in Li
separating Zi from Bi, that is, for every
(
zi, yi
)
in Zi ×Bi,
pi · zi ≥ pi · yi.
This, in particular, exploiting the interiority of consumption plan xi in Xi and
strict monotonicity of preferences, ensures that pi is a strictly positive element of
Li and that
zi i xi implies pi · (zi − xi) > 0.
Let P i (q) be the restriction of P (q) to Li, that is,
P i (q) =
{
(pσ)σ∈Si ∈ Li : p ∈ P (q)
}
.
If pi is not an element of P i (q), being strictly positive, then it cannot be an element
of the closure of P i (q). By strong separation, if pi is not an element of the closure
of P i (q), there exists a non-null hi in Li such that, for every p in P i (q),
pi · hi > p · hi.
As P i (q) is an open cone in Li, it follows that pi · hi > 0 and that p · hi ≤ 0 for
every p in P (q). By interiority of the consumption plan, at no loss of generality,
one might assume that xi+hi is an element of Bi, whereas, by strict monotonicity
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of preferences, xi + ui is an element of Zi for every  > 0, where ui is the unit of
Li. However, by the first application of the separation theorem,
pi · ui ≥ pi · hi.
As  > 0 is arbitrarily small, this reveals a contradiction. 
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Let e > 0 in L satisfy condition (foc). Pick any γ in S such
that eγ > 0. Consider the tree with root at γ obtained by taking the successors σ
of γ with eσ > 0; that is, denoting σ− the immediate predecessor of a (non-initial)
date-event σ in S (γ), consider the tree
F = {σ ∈ S (γ) : eσ > 0, eσ− > 0} .
Note that, for every σ in F , by (foc), for some τ in σ+, eτ > 0. Hence, by (foc),
for every σ in F ,
ρ
1
pσeσ
≥ 1∑
τ∈σ+ pτeτ
.
Consider a λ > 0 in RS defined, for the initial date-event γ in F , by some λγ > 0;
for every σ in F , at every τ in σ+ ∩ F , by
λτ =
(
pτeτ∑
τ∈σ+ pτeτ
)
λσ;
for every σ in (S/F), by λσ = 0. It can be easily verified that λ > 0 is an element
of Λ. In addition, it follows that, given any σ in F , for every τ in σ+ ∩ F ,
ρt(σ)−t(γ)+1
λγ
pγeγ
≥ ρ λσ
pσeσ
≥ λσ∑
τ∈σ+ pτeτ
≥ λτ
pτeτ
≥ 1‖e‖
λτ
pτ
.
This suffices to prove that (wwc) is satisfied.
Assuming that λ > 0 in Λ satisfies condition (wcc), for every σ in S, define
eσ =
λσ
ρt(σ)pσ
.
This delivers an element e > 0 of L, because of (wcc). In addition, for every σ in
S,
pσeσ =
(
1
ρt(σ)
)
λσ ≤ ρ
(
1
ρt(σ)+1
) ∑
τ∈σ+
λτ = ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ,
so proving that condition (foc) is satisfied.
Clearly, if e > 0 in L satisfies condition (foc), without loss of generality, by the
simple argument we sketch below, it can be assumed that, at every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ = pσeσ.
Indeed, there exists t in T such that∑σ∈(S/St) eσ > 0 in L. By proceeding forward,
possibly contracting the element e of L, the equality can be assumed for every σ in
(S/St). This modification, involving contractions, does not affect boundedness. By
proceeding backward, possibly modifying the element e of L, the equality can be
satisfied at every σ in St. This latter modification, involving finitely many terms,
does not affect boundedness as well. Thus, after both modifications, e remains
an element of L. This suffices to prove that the operator Tp : L → L admits an
eigenvalue larger than the unity, so that condition (drc) holds.
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Assume that condition (drc) is satisfied, that is, for some 1 > ρ > 0, there
exists a non-null element e of L satisfying ρTp (e) = e. As Tp is a positive linear
operator,
ρTp (|e|) ≥ ρ |Tp (e)| = |e| ,
which proves that condition (foc) is satisfied. 
Proof of proposition 2. Necessity follows, through lemma 6, from lemma 7, whereas
sufficiency is proved by lemma 8. 
Lemma 6. Given 1 > ρ > 0, there exists v > 0 in L satisfying ρnTnp (v) ≥ v only
if there exists e > 0 in L satisfying ρTp (e) ≥ e.
Proof of lemma 6. Define
e = v + ρTp (v) + · · ·+ ρn−1Tn−1p (v) .
By positivity of operator Tp, e ≥ v > 0. It follows that
ρTp (e) ≥ ρTp (v) + · · ·+ ρn−1Tn−1p (v) + ρnTnp (v) ≥ e+ ρnTnp (v)− v ≥ e.
This proves the claim. 
Lemma 7. Under the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross) interest rates, an allo-
cation x in X, with supporting price p in P , is robustly inefficient only if condition
(foc) is satisfied.
Proof of lemma 7. The proof requires the preliminary introduction of some pieces
of notation. The underlying logic is as sort of reduction to a two-period economy in
order to obtain a necessary criterion, which is then retraced to the original economy
through lemma 6.
For every σ in S, define
〈σ〉 = {ν ∈ S (σ) : t (ν) ≤ t (σ) + n− 1}
and
〈σ〉+ = {ν ∈ S (σ) : t (ν) = t (σ) + n} .
In addition, for every σ in S,
Gσ =
{
i ∈ G : 〈σ〉 ∩ Si 6= ∅}
is the set of individuals acting at some date-event ν in 〈σ〉;
G+σ = {i ∈ G : i = i (τ) for some τ ∈ 〈σ〉}
is the set of individuals initiating their activity at some date-event ν in 〈σ〉; finally,
G−σ =
(Gσ/G+σ )
is the set of individuals acting at some date-event ν in 〈σ〉 that are inherited from
previous date-events (or from the unrepresented past at the initial date-event) and
exhaust their economic activity over date-events 〈σ〉. Notice that, by construction,
for every date-event σ in S,
G+σ =
⋃
τ∈〈σ〉+
G−τ .
Finally, we use the following notational convention: given an element v = (vσ)σ∈S
of L, for every σ in S, vσ is itself regarded as an element of L, so that v =
∑
σ∈S vσ;
in addition, given a (non-empty) subset F of S, for an element v = (vσ)σ∈S of L,
vF =
∑
σ∈S vσ is a well-defined element of L (that is, it is the algebraic projection
of v in L onto {v ∈ L : vσ = 0 for every σ ∈ (S/F)}).
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Assume robust inefficiency, that is, that allocation x in X is Pareto dominated
by an alternative allocation z in X satisfying, for some  > 0,
−
∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)− ≥∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi) .
Notice that this implies that, for every σ in S,∑
i∈Gσ
(
zi − xi)−〈σ〉 ≥
−
∑
i∈Gσ
(
zi − xi)−〈σ〉 + ∑
i∈Gσ
(
zi − xi)−〈σ〉 ≥ ∑
i∈Gσ
(
zi − xi)+〈σ〉
≥
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)+〈σ〉 .
The middle inequality directly follows from robust inefficiency, as only individuals
in Gσ are active at date-events in 〈σ〉. The last inequality holds true because
individuals in G−σ form a subset of individuals in Gσ. Therefore, at every σ in S,
−
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 ≥
−
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)+〈σ〉 ≥
−
∑
i∈Gσ
(
zi − xi)−〈σ〉 ≥ ∑
i∈Gσ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉
≥
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 + ∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 ,
where the last inequality (in fact, an equality) is implied by the partition of indi-
viduals in Gσ in the two subsets G−σ and G+σ . Hence, for every σ in S,
−
(
1
1 + 
) ∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 ≥ ∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 .
In addition, for every σ in S,
p ·
∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 + ∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
p ·
∑
i∈G−τ
(
zi − xi)〈τ〉 =
p ·
∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 + ∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
p ·
∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈τ〉 =
p ·
∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi) ≥ 0,
where the initial equalities follow from the decomposition of net trades, whereas
the last inequality is implied by price support. This establishes that, at every σ in
S,
(*)
(
1
1 + 
) ∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
p ·
∑
i∈G−τ
(
zi − xi)〈τ〉 ≥ p · ∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 .
Let v in RS be defined, for every σ in S, by
vσ =
 1
pσ
p ·
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉
+ .
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In fact, as the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross) interest rates guarantees bound-
edness (see (†)), v is a positive element of L and, by inequality (*), it satisfies, at
every σ in S, (
1
1 + 
) ∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
That is, ρnTnp (v) ≥ v, where
ρ =
(
1
1 + 
) 1
n
.
Hence, applying lemma 6 would prove the claim, provided that v is a non-null
element of L.
To obtain a contradiction, assume not, that is, at every σ in S,
−p ·
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 ≥ 0.
Feasibility implies that, at every t in T ,
−
∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)−St+n−1 ≥ ∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)St+n−1
=
∑
i∈G−t
(
zi − xi)+ ∑
σ∈St
∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 ,
where St = {σ ∈ S : t (σ) ≤ t}, St = {σ ∈ S : t (σ) = t} and
G−t =
⋃
σ∈St
G−σ .
Taking values, by price support, yields, for every t in T ,
−p ·
∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)−St+n−1 ≥ p · ∑
i∈Gt−
(
zi − xi)+ ∑
σ∈St
p ·
∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉
≥ −
∑
σ∈St
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
p ·
∑
i∈G+σ
(
zi − xi)〈τ〉
≥ −
∑
σ∈St
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
p ·
∑
i∈G−τ
(
zi − xi)〈τ〉
≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds true by hypothesis. That is, by strict positivity of
price p in P , ∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)− = 0.
This reveals a contradiction, as any feasible Pareto improvement requires the trans-
fer of some resources. 
Lemma 8. An interior allocation x in X, with smoothly supporting price p in P ,
is robustly inefficient if condition (foc) is satisfied.
Proof of lemma 8. At no loss of generality, it can be assumed that there exists
1 >  > 0 such that, at every σ in S,
(1− ) ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ≥ pσeσ.
Let λ > 0 be given by the hypothesis of smooth support at 1 > ρ > 0 and, at no
loss of generality, assume that ‖e‖ ≤ 1 and that xi ≥ λui for every individual i
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in G, where ui is the unit of Li. Thus, define an alternative allocation z in X by
setting, for every σ in S,
zi(σ) = xi(σ) − λeσ + (1− )
∑
τ∈σ+
λeτ .
As feasibility is obviously satisfied, along with a positive destruction of transferred
resources, smooth support suffices to prove the claim, redistributing resources made
available by the above transfers. 
Proof of lemma 1. Suppose that allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by alloca-
tion y in X satisfying, for some 1 >  > 0,∑
i∈G
(
yi − xi)+ ≤ (1− )∑
i∈G
(
yi − xi)−
and, for every individual i in G,
p · (yi − xi) ≥ 0, for every p ∈ P (q) .
Define an alternative allocation z in X by setting, for every individual i in G,
zi = yi + 
(
yi − xi)−, so that (zi − xi)− ≤ (yi − xi)−. It follows that, given any
p in P (q), for every individual i in G,
p · (zi − xi) ≥ p · (yi − xi)+ p · (yi − xi)− ≥ p · (zi − xi)− ,
that is, (
1
1 + 
)
p · (zi − xi)+ ≥ p · (zi − xi)− .
In addition, feasibility might be straightly verified. As far as the reverse implication
is concerned, at no loss of generality, it can be assumed that there exists 1 >  > 0
such that, for every individual i in G,
(1− ) ρp · (zi − xi)+ ≥ p · (zi − xi)− , for every p ∈ P (q) .
Let λ > 0 be given by the assumption of smooth support at 1 > ρ > 0. At
no loss of generality, by convexity of preferences, assume that
∥∥zi − xi∥∥ ≤ λ for
every individual i in G. Define the alternative allocation y in X by letting, for
every individual i in G, yi = zi −  (zi − xi)+. Smooth support ensures a Pareto
improvement. In addition,∑
i∈G
(
yi − xi)+ ≤
(1− )
∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)+ ≤ (1− )∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)−
≤ (1− )
∑
i∈G
(
yi − xi)− ,
so proving the claim. 
Proof of lemma 2. This is basically the proof of the First Welfare Theorem. Indeed,
suppose that G∗ is a finite set. By welfare improvement, there exists p∗ in P (q) such
that, for some individual i in G∗, p∗ · (zi − xi) > 0. In addition, by unambiguous
inefficiency (condition (§)), for every individual i in G∗, p∗ · (zi − xi) ≥ 0. Hence,
summing up, as p∗ in P (q) is positive,
0 <
∑
i∈G∗
p∗ · (zi − xi) ≤ p∗ · ∑
i∈G∗
(
zi − xi) ≤ p∗ ·∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi) ≤ 0,
a contradiction. 
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Proof of lemma 3. Supposing not, there exists p in P (q) such that p ·∑i∈G xi is
finite and, hence, p in P defines a sequential (i.e., order continuous) linear functional
on {
v ∈ L : |v| ≤ λ
∑
i∈G
xi for some λ > 0
}
.
By unambiguous Pareto dominance (condition (§)), for every individual i in G,
p · (zi − xi) ≥ 0. Summing up and using feasibility, for some 1 >  > 0,
0 ≤ p ·
∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi) ≤ −p ·∑
i∈G
(
zi − xi)− < 0,
a contradiction. 
Proof of proposition 3. Necessity follows, through lemma 9, from lemma 10, whereas
sufficiency is proved by lemma 11. 
Lemma 9. Given 1 > ρ > 0, there exists v > 0 in L satisfying ρn
∧
p∈P (q) T
n
p (v) ≥
v only if there exists e > 0 in L satisfying ρ
∧
p∈P (q) Tp (e) ≥ e.
Proof of lemma 9. Preliminarily, observe that the cone of prices satisfies the fol-
lowing decomposition property: for every σ in S, one might define a map fσ :
P (q)× P (q)S → P (q) by setting
fσ
(
p, (pν)ν∈S
)
= p−
∑
τ∈σ+
pS(τ) +
∑
τ∈σ+
(
pτ
pττ
)
pτS(τ),
where, by notational convention, given an element v of RS , for every σ in S, vS(σ)
is the element of RS coinciding with v on S (σ) and vanishing on (S/S (σ)). Price
fσ
(
p, (pν)ν∈S
)
follows price p up to date-events in σ+ and (normalized) price pτ
beginning from date-event τ in σ+.
Peg any m in N. We shall show that, given any p in P (q), for every e in L,
Tp
 ∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tmp∗ (e)
 ≥ ∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tm+1p∗ (e) .
To this purpose, observe that, for every ν in S, ∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tmp∗ (e)

ν
=
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tmp∗ (e)ν .
Thus, given η > 0, for every ν in S, there exists pν in P (q) such that
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tmp∗ (e)ν + η ≥ Tmpν (e)ν .
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Given any σ in S, exploiting the positivity of Tp, by direct computation, one verifies
that
Tp
 ∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tmp∗ (e)

σ
+ ηTp (u)σ =
Tp
 ∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tmp∗ (e) + ηu

σ
=
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
 ∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tmp∗ (e)τ + η

≥ 1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτT
m
pτ (e)τ
= Tm+1
fσ(p,(pν)ν∈S)
(e)σ
≥
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tm+1p∗ (e)σ .
As η > 0 is arbitrarily small, this proves the claim.
Define
e = v + ρ
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tp∗ (v) + · · ·+ ρn−1
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tn−1p∗ (v) .
By positivity of operators (Tp∗)p∗∈P (q), e ≥ v > 0. It follows that
ρTp (e) = ρTp (v) + · · ·+ ρnTp
 ∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tn−1p∗ (v)

≥ ρ
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tp∗ (v) + · · ·+ ρn−1
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tn−1p∗ (v) + ρ
n
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tnp∗ (v)
= e+ ρn
∧
p∗∈P (q)
Tnp∗ (v)− v
≥ e,
which proves the claim. 
Lemma 10. Under the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross) interest rates, an al-
location x in X, with supporting asset price q in Q, is unambiguously robustly
inefficient only if condition (foc) is satisfied.
Proof of lemma 10. Using the notation of lemma 7, by an analogous argument, one
obtains that, for every price p in P (q), at every σ in S,
(**)
(
1
1 + 
) ∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
p ·
∑
i∈G−τ
(
zi − xi)〈τ〉 ≥ p · ∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉 .
Let a positive element v of RS be defined, for every σ in S, by
vσ =
 ∧
p∗∈P (q)
1
p∗σ
p∗ ·
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉
+ .
In fact, as the hypothesis of non-vanishing (gross) interest rates guarantees bounded-
ness (see (†)), v is a positive element of L. As in the proof of lemma 9, for every σ
in S, one might define a map fnσ : P (q)× P (q)S → P (q) by setting
fnσ
(
p, (pν)ν∈S
)
= p−
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
pS(τ) +
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
(
pτ
pττ
)
pτS(τ).
22
As a matter of fact, price fnσ
(
p, (pν)ν∈S
)
follows price p up to date-events in 〈σ〉+
and (normalized) price pτ beginning from date-event τ in 〈σ〉+. Notice that, given
η > 0, for every ν in S, there exists pν in P (q) such that
vν + η ≥
 1
pνν
pν ·
∑
i∈G−ν
(
zi − xi)〈ν〉
+ .
Given p in P (q), for every σ in S, evaluating inequality (**) at price fnσ
(
p, (pν)ν∈S
)
in P (q) yields
ρn
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
pτvτ + ηρn
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
pτ =
ρn
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
pτ (vτ + η) ≥
ρn
∑
τ∈〈σ〉+
pτ
 1
pττ
pτ ·
∑
i∈G−τ
(
zi − xi)〈τ〉
+ ≥ pσ
 1
pσ
p ·
∑
i∈G−σ
(
zi − xi)〈σ〉
+
≥ pσvσ,
where
ρ =
(
1
1 + 
) 1
n
.
That is, as η > 0 is arbitrarily small, there exists a positive element v of L satisfying,
for every p in P (q), ρnTnp (v) ≥ v. Exploiting lemma 9, the claim is proved, provided
that v is a non-null element of L. This follows from an argument that is analogous
to that in the last part of the proof of lemma 6. 
Lemma 11. An interior allocation x in X, with smoothly supporting asset price q
in Q, is robustly inefficient if condition (foc) is satisfied.
Proof of lemma 11. At no loss of generality, it can be assumed that there exists
1 >  > 0 such that, at every σ in S,
(1− ) ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτeτ ≥ pσeσ, for every p ∈ P (q) .
Let λ > 0 be given by the hypothesis of smooth support at 1 > ρ > 0 and, at no
loss of generality, assume that ‖e‖ ≤ 1 and that xi ≥ λui for every individual i
in G, where ui is the unit of Li. Thus, define an alternative allocation z in X by
setting, for every σ in S,
zi(σ) = xi(σ) − λeσ + (1− )
∑
τ∈σ+
λeτ .
Feasibility is obviously satisfied, along with a positive destruction of transferred
resources, and smooth support guarantees a welfare improvement, redistributing
resources made available by the above transfers. In addition, condition (§) is obvi-
ously satisfied. 
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